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**“ELECTORAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, PEACE AND  
SECURITY IN AFRICA”**



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## **Abstract**

Electoral conflict has received increasing international attention in recent years due to the devastating effects of outbreaks of violence in states such as Kenya, Zimbabwe, Egypt, Sudan and South Sudan especially around election periods. This research paper is a response to the increasing electoral conflicts in Africa. The authors will define and interrelate the central themes: peace, peacebuilding, security in Africa and electoral conflict management. The paper seeks to answer the following questions: What are the causes of electoral conflicts and disputes in Africa? What are the appropriate approaches to the management of electoral conflicts? How do electoral conflicts impact on peace and security in Africa?

Institutionalization Before Liberalization (IBL) paradigm will provide a prism through which to conceptualize the study. Methodologically, the authors will use secondary sources like accredited journals relevant to the research themes, relevant books as well as primary sources that include interviews to gather data.

## **1. Introduction**

The paper is a response to electoral conflicts in Africa and the resultant challenges to peace and security. The authors first describe the theoretical framework Institutionalisation before Liberalisation (IBL), then discuss and interconnect the central themes; electoral conflict management, peace and security in Africa. Also, covered in the paper is the nature and causes of electoral conflicts in Africa, ethnicity and postcolonial electoral conflicts, and consequences of electoral conflicts in Africa. Lastly, the authors in reference to IBL and the Electoral Risk Management Tool (ERMT) by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) proposes appropriate measures for mitigating, transforming, and managing electoral conflicts.

## **2. Institutionalisation Before Liberalisation (IBL)**

Lyons (2009:91) argues that the liberal internationalist paradigm posits that peace, both between and within states, is based on market democracy and that constructing democratic political structures is a key to sustainable peace. This study is guided by an improvement to liberalisation theory, as proposed by Paris (2004:187). In this regard, see also Keating and Knight (2004: XXXIX-XL). Initially, Paris (1997:56) was of the opinion that a single

paradigm-liberal internationalism-appears to guide the work of most international agencies engaged in peace-building. The central tenet of this paradigm is the assumption that the surest foundation for peace, both within and between states, is market democracy, that is, a liberal democratic polity and a market-oriented economy. Paris (2004:187) suggests an alternative, improved approach-the concept of Institutionalisation before Liberalisation (IBL). Paris asserts that the peace-building strategy that he proposes would preserve the Wilsonian goal of transforming war-shattered states into liberal market democracies in the long run, while minimizing the destabilizing effects of the liberalisation process in the short run. The central recommendation of IBL is that peace-builders should concentrate on constructing a framework of effective institutions prior to promoting political and economic competition.

Bar-Siman-Tov (1994:78) defines institutionalization as the informal or formal attempts to put conflict relations between the parties on a more stable basis and predictable footing in order to reduce the magnitude, scope, and possibility of armed confrontation. Bar-Siman-Tov (1994:78) outlines five functions of institutionalization: Preventing crises; blocking or reducing incentives for escalation; promoting and facilitating de-escalatory measures; establishing new patterns of behaviour leading to the development of more durable norms of conflict management; and encouraging expectations toward resolution of the conflict. According to Paris (2004:187), what is needed in the immediate post conflict period will not be democratic ferment and economic upheaval, but rather political stability and the establishment of an effective administration over the territory. Paris (2004:187) further clarifies this statement by saying that only when a working governmental authority has been re-established, should peace-builders initiate a series of gradual democratic and market-oriented reforms. Paris (2004:188) believes that "peace-builders should delay liberalisation and limit political and economic freedoms in the short run, in order to create conditions for smoother and less hazardous transitions to market democracy-and durable peace-in the long run."

The main elements of IBL therefore include (Paris2004:188):

- i. postponing elections until moderate political parties have been created, and mechanisms to ensure compliance with the results of the elections have been established;
- ii. designing electoral rules that reward moderation instead of extremism;

- iii. encouraging the development of civil-society organizations that cut across lines of societal conflicts, and proscribing those that advocate violence;
- iv. regulating incendiary “hate speech”
- v. promoting economic reforms that moderate rather than exacerbate societal tensions; and
- vi. Developing effective security institutions and a professional, neutral bureaucracy

Considering the main IBL elements, it is clear that many post-conflict electoral process management in Africa clearly fits into the paradigm. For instance, developing effective security institutions and a professional neutral bureaucracy; designing effective electoral rules and procedures; and promoting economic reforms that moderate societal tensions, are of critical significance in managing most of electoral conflicts in Africa.

### **3. Nature and Causes of Electoral Conflicts in Africa**

#### **3.1 Nature of electoral conflicts in Africa**

According to the Berghof seminar Report number 115 Dudouet and Schmelzle (2006:4-5) discussing the root causes of violent conflict and the core hypothesis regarding the difficulties in contemporary conflict transformation. Wulf (2006:3-7) argue that the unsatisfactory outcome of many attempts to resolve conflicts peacefully has to do with the "insufficient analysis of the root causes of conflict" which leads in turn to competing and contradictory strategies. As a result, Dudouet and Schmelzle (2006:4-5) outline a whole range of complementary, competing and contradictory assumptions about the root causes of conflict. In their view, Dudouet and Schmelzle notes that the question about the root causes of conflict is not abstract or theoretical question and if the causes of conflict are misperceived, then the remedies suggested or implemented will not solve the problems.

Dudouet and Schmelzle (2006:4-5) and Wulf (2006:3-7) have reviewed the most prominent explanations for protracted violent conflicts and outline that: Today’s conflicts are sometimes described as a new barbarism, similar to Thomas Hobbes’ vision of “war of each against all”. Alternatively, (Dudouet & Schmelzle 2006:4-5 and Wulf 2006:3-7) argue that some scholars see the risk of civil war systematically related to economic factors, in the sense that the availability of resources tends to contribute to war making, while objective measures of social grievance have no systematic effect on risks of war. In relation to the latter point, Dudouet, Schmelzle and Wulf note that the grievance concept, postulates that those who are deprived

of economic and social development opportunities tend to resort to violence to ensure their livelihood. Besides, many social scientists conceive the erosion of majority African states, states failure, and domestic politics failure as the central cause for war, armed violence and electoral conflicts in Africa. Brinkerhoff (2005:4) notes that failing and failed states generally exhibit the opposite for instance; policies that favour powerful elites, few budget control, rampant corruption, cronyism, patronage arrangements that limit opportunity, siphon off public assets for private gain, and usually a combination of punitive use of existing regulations and exemptions to benefit the favoured few. Thus aggravating electoral and post-election conflicts. Service delivery and economic development effectiveness also relates to electoral and democratic legitimacy in that citizens tend to withdraw support from governments that cannot or will not provide basic services and some level of economic opportunity. Particularly when coupled with ethnic tension, weak states' inability and unwillingness to engage in dialogues with citizens contributes to state failure, the eruption of renewed conflict and electoral and post electoral conflicts.

Moreover, Dudouet, Schmelzle and Wulf state that sometimes external support embedded in the context of intensifying globalisation has been taken as a main cause of violent conflict and electoral conflict. Examples are foreign economic aid, granting sanctuary to rebels, funds from a diasporas or trade with conflict parties, foreign armed forces and arms dealers.

Ethnicity, religious and cultural cleavage, fundamentalism, group identity and traditional ethnic hatred often exacerbated by elite manipulations have frequently been considered as factors contributing to electoral conflicts in Africa. Also, the availability of weapons, especially the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, contributes to violent conflicts, electoral conflict and post-election conflicts (Dudouet & Schmelzle 2006:4-5). Privatisation and outsourcing of traditional police and military functions, while not the causes of conflicts, influences how electoral conflicts and wars are manipulated. Multi-cause explanations are also popular in explaining nature and causes of electoral conflicts. One example is the argument that authoritarian rule, weak states, socio-economic deprivation, inequity and exclusion of minorities form the primary cause of large-scale electoral conflicts in Africa and the subsequent violence.

Dudouet & Schmelzle (2006:4-5) also observe that an overarching explanation of conflict cause was offered by Michael Lund (2006:2), who argued that most contemporary electoral

conflicts arise from the processes of liberalisation and are in fact symptoms of a clash 'between differing societal and international normative orders between a status quo order and a rival new order, and thus between the competing entitlements and rights that the antagonists each claim are inalienable.

Furthermore, Dudouet and Schmelzle (2006:4-5) argue that scholars agree that the analysis of root causes underlying conflict intervention is often rather ad hoc, patchy and even contradictory. And that despite of the long list of conflict causes, Dudouet and Schmelzle (2006:5) note that some important factors, for example poverty and gender are also to be considered in the discussion of electoral conflicts. Also observed by Dudouet and Schmelzle is the fact that there is need to include history more fully into the analysis of causes of electoral conflict and that accurate analysis was difficult to achieve though an in-depth analysis of contextualised factors, regularly updated, is indispensable.

In addition, theories should be applied to explain the most salient factors in a given place at a given time. Thus allowing for a range of theories rather than searching for one meta-theory of electoral conflict transformation, management and resolution (Dudouet and Schmelzle 2006:5). Focusing on conflict causes, Mitchell (2005:4-7) cautions against trying to take into account of all possible causes of conflict thus potentially prolonging the stage of analysis indefinitely. Instead, Mitchell recommended that electoral conflict transformation should focus on the more straightforward questions of: How did the conflict start?, What keeps the conflict going? And what are the short term, medium term and long term changeable and tractable causes of the conflict.

### **3.2 Electoral conflicts impact on peace and security in Africa**

A high priority activity in post-electoral conflict and war-torn societies is coping with the lack of security (Brinkerhoff 2005:6). Matanock (2012:9) answering the question 'what role do post-conflict elections play?' says that there is a lack of consensus in the field of electoral conflict management as to what purpose elections in general serve, even outside of the post-conflict context. Although, Matanock (2012:9) observes that much of the existing literature, and most common wisdom, treats elections simply as a mechanism for distributing power and recourse: the electorate through a constraining set of institutions decides on how power and recourse are divided between political parties, which in turn, divide these among their

supporters. However, in the African context election ‘winners’ are the one who benefits more from recourses and power sharing.

Owuor (2008:113) notes that the consequence of election conflicts include; closely contested election, ethnic division, flawed electoral process, a weak institutional framework and post election violence that results in death, displacement and the destruction of dollars worth of properties. Citing the example of the Kenya fourth multiparty elections, Owuor argues that although regular elections may be a critical element of a democracy they are not, in themselves, a guarantee of sustainable peace and democracy. Motanock (2012:11) share same views with Owuor 2008 and argues that post-conflict elections, even those with participation by both sides, serve very different purposes: elections may operate as a division mechanisms (as in the case in majority of African countries) by providing information on the relative strengths of the sides, or they may be enacted due to a change in legitimacy if normative concerns drive the change. Motanock offers more insight on the theme of elections by arguing that elections as a commitment device have substantially different implications compared to elections as a division mechanism or as an indicator of commitment device.

Brinkerhoff (2005:4) notes that electoral Conflicts and resultant wars destroy basic infrastructure, disrupt the delivery of core services (e.g. health, education, electricity, water, sanitation) and impede the day-to-day routines associated with making a living. In the worst-case scenarios, they lead to widespread suffering, massive population dislocation, humanitarian crises and epidemics, which overwhelm the already inadequate effectiveness of governments. The inability of failed and post-conflict states to provide fundamental public goods and services has impacts on both the immediate prospects for tending to citizens’ basic needs and restarting economic activity, and long-term prospects for assuring welfare, reducing poverty, and facilitating socio-economic growth. Thus, Restoring (or in some cases creating) service delivery capacity and initiating economic recovery are central to governance reconstruction agendas. Motanock 2012: also, notes that elections could be used as a mechanism some African politicians to engaging the international community. In this case, electoral contestation between a militant group and the government supplies a mechanism for engaging third parties, especially international actors, in the peace process in order to help the protagonists overcome the commitment problem.

### 3.3 Ethnicity and postcolonial electoral conflicts

Describing how majority of Africans view each other, Bratton and Kimenyi (2008:6-7) note that although Africans downplay ethnicity when portraying themselves, they are less charitable in their assessments of fellow citizens. In a survey by Bratton and Kimenyi (2008), it is revealed that most Africans do not easily trust co-nationals who hail from ethnic groups other than their own; they also think that political conflict is all too common among people of different ethnic backgrounds, especially in the national political arena. Finally, they worry that their co-nationals are prone to organize themselves politically along exclusive ethnic lines and to govern in discriminatory fashion. According to Chelanga, Ndege, and Singo (2009:9) there is no doubt in Africa, ethnicity constitutes an integral part of political, economic, and social life. It is played out in virtually all aspects of public and private life. Moreover, Chelanga, Ndege, and Singo (2009:9) argue that ethnicity manifest itself peacefully in debates but violently in ethnic clashes alongside or in tandem with issues related to land, agriculture, gender, poverty, and democracy among other related issues.

According to Posner (2007:1302), multipartysim in the postcolonial era has caused ethnic conflict to be carried out in the name of different kinds of identities. And that political competition in multiparty settings creates incentives for individuals to see themselves in terms of ethnic identities that define them as members of large blocks-usually based on religious, linguistic, or regional distinctions. Although political liberalization in Africa in the early nineties came with its positive aspects like freedom of speech, liberalization of the media and multipartyism in the political arena, political liberalization has also strengthened ethnic differences with most of the dominant ethnic groupings in African countries associating themselves with specific electronic and print medias in their respective countries. Thus, Posner (2007:1306) maintains that Africa is a place where ethnicity matters, where people view their political representatives as sources of patronage and where citizens assume that having a member of their ethnic group in a position of political power will increase their access to state resources.

Similarly, Adar (2001:6) argues that elite manipulation of ethnicity, as the focal point for political power is a common phenomenon in Africa post-independence history, with multiparty elections clearly demonstrating this pattern. At the core of this trend of electoral process is the issue of the control of the state, the locus of political power and wealth accumulation. This behaviour by the élites not only encourages political patronage and



undermines democratization but also perpetuates ethnic polarization and differences. For instance, Ethnic conflicts in the Rift Valley, Nyanza, Coast and Western Provinces of Kenya which continued prior to, and after, the 1992 and 1997 elections can be understood in this context. Specifically, ethnic cleansing is a consequence of élite manipulation (Adar 2001:6).

According to Bratton and Kimenyi (2008:1), post-election violence in some of African countries paints a picture severely fractured by ethnic cleavages. The cycle of violence around elections in Africa appears to support views expressed by the first generation of independent African leaders, who argued that Africa was best suited for single party systems of governance because multipartyism would result in increased tribalism. Yet it would be unwise to jump to the conclusion that Africans are not ready for democratic competition (Bratton and Kimenyi 2008:1). Chelanga, Ndege and Singo (2009:194) maintain that what is important is how African states understands, harnesses, integrates or accommodates ethnicity into its politics through constitutional and legal processes.

### **3.4 Other sources and related consequences of electoral conflicts in Africa**

Deng (1996:119), citing the former UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros Ghali, notes that poverty, diseases, famine, oppression and despair thrive in intrastate electoral conflicts. Esteban and Debraj (2008:163) argue that the onset of electoral conflicts critically depends on the political system in place. Litscher (2008:48), Nasongo, Achoka and Wamocha (2009:XXX) and Kwaja (2009:41) acknowledge that, the main trigger of violent electoral and post election conflicts in Africa is disputed Presidential election and the quest for political power by political parties. However, other vital peripheral issues have also been traced and linked to electoral conflict. Amongst them include: First, the colonial leadership legacy that encroached into the post-colonial government through leadership policies that has influenced constitution rules and land ownership (See also Bogaards 2006:120). Second, the international financial institutions and economic conditionalities that were imposed on African countries in the 1990s and ethnicity abuse by political leadership. And third is the failures of African governments to resolve problems like high unemployment rates and inequitable resource distribution. Also, incompetency in tendering, procurement and purchasing of electoral materials and personnel has been raised as contributors to African electoral conflicts.

Ajulu (2007:33) suggests that African political economy, reflecting, as it were, deep-seated frustrations rooted in the socio-economic injustices of landlessness, joblessness and poverty that have beset African countries since independence and impacts on electoral conflicts. However, we note that Kokole (1996:126) maintains that while ethnicity by itself need not to generate ethnic conflicts, it is evident that ethnicity can be exploited and manipulated enough to generate social conflict, especially in the African context. According to Okoth (2012:10) other electoral vices included: selling of voters cards, bribing voters, multiple voter registrations, and using of youth by some political aspirants to intimidate other candidates and cause electoral violence. Adar (2001:6) also observes that apart from ethnic-centred elections, other endemic problems that continue to undermine democratization in Africa include, inter alia, an authoritarian state system, intra-party differences, inter-party polarization, the multiplicity of political parties, personal ambitions, and differences, vote buying, corruption, lack of independent competent judiciary systems in African countries that manipulates elections in favour of the ruling parties in Africa, lack of a constitutional framework consistent with a multi-party system, and lack of political will within African countries to allow democratization.

## **4. Managing Electoral Conflicts, Peace and Security in Africa**

### **4.1 Electoral Conflict Management**

A conflict is a long term, deep-rooted incompatibility between two or more parties that involve seemingly non-negotiable issues (attitudes, values) that are resistant to resolution.

Precisely, Thomas (1992:265) defines conflict as 'the process which begins when one party perceives that another has frustrated, or is about to frustrate, some concern of his. Electoral conflict as a form of conflict may be as a result of intrastate secessionist conflicts that are sometimes accompanied or aggravated by ethnic conflict as well as other conflict causing agents. They are long term and deep-rooted. Electoral conflict management is controlling, limiting, and containing election conflict behaviour in such a way as to make it less destructive or violent. Managing electoral conflict does not necessarily eliminate the causes of electoral conflicts but may help towards transforming them. Associated to electoral conflict management is the concept of electoral conflict transformation. Transformation entails bringing about some major change in some aspects of the conflict or the socio-political system in which the conflict is embedded. In the transformation process, at least the conception of profound change is implied.

#### **4.2 Peace and security in Africa**

Peace is explained as a state of tranquillity or rather as a freedom from civil disturbance, a state of security or order within a community provided for by law or custom 'a breach of the peace', freedom from disquieting or oppressive thoughts or emotions, harmony in personal relations, a state or period of mutual concord between governments, a pact or agreement to end hostilities between those who have been at war or in a state of enmity (Webster online dictionary 2014:1). According to the oxford web dictionary 2014, peace is mental or emotional, a state or period in which there is no war or a war has ended. Related to peace is the concepts of peacebuilding and post-conflict peacebuilding. Tait (2001:9), Kuhne (2001:383) and Reychler (2001:12) defines peacebuilding as the activity that seeks to "prevent violent conflict from re-emerging" and the efforts to "rebuild the capabilities of a society to resolve conflict without fighting." Reychler argues that peacebuilding is the constructive transformation of conflict and the creation of a sustainable peace environment. Through peacebuilding, the conflict is not merely resolved though the whole situation shifts. The term peacebuilding refers to all efforts required on the way to the creation of a sustainable peace zone (Reychler 2001:12). Kanyako (2012:2) defines Post-conflict peacebuilding as the set of long-and and short-term activities undertaken in a post-war phase to lay the foundation for longer-term developments. Peacebuilding is more than post-accord reconstruction, but involves the post conflict transformation of hostile and violent relationships into a peace system characterised by just and interdependent relationships.

Defining security, the online oxford dictionary 2014 notes that security is; the state of being free from danger or threat, the safety of a state or organisation against criminal activity such as terrorism, theft, or espionage. Security is also described, as procedures followed or measures taken to ensure the security of a state or organisation, the state of feeling safe, stable, and free from fear or anxiety. Fayemi (2012:1) paraphrasing UNDP, Human Development Report 1994 says that for most people today in Africa, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about the daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event. Job security, income security, health security, environmental security, and security from crime are the emerging concerns of human security all over the world and specifically in Africa. Buzan (1991:433) categorise security into the following categories: military security, political security, economic security, societal security, environmental security. According to Buzan, the above five security categories do not operate in isolation from each other, they are

woven together in a strong web of linkages and each defines a focal point within the electoral conflict security problematique. Political security concerns the organisational stability of states systems of government, and the ideologies that give them legitimacy. According to Paris (2004:188), what is needed in post electoral conflicts is political stability and the establishment of an effective administrative institutions and government. Economic security concerns access to the recourses, finance and markets necessary to sustain acceptable level of welfare and state power. Paris notes that promoting economic reforms that moderate rather than exacerbate societal tensions are vital in African electoral and post electoral conflicts. Societal security concerns the ability of societies to reproduce their traditional patterns of language, culture, association, religious, national identity, and customs within acceptable conditions for evolution. While, environmental security concerns the maintenance of the local and the planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend (Jakobsen 2012:1).

#### **4.3 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) approach to management of electoral conflicts**

The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) (2013:1-14) has provided an Electoral Risk Management Tool (ERMT). ERMT provides knowledge to democracy builders including policy development, analysis and it supports democratic reforms in an effort to manage and mitigate electoral conflicts. ERMT builds users capacity to understand electoral risk factors, collect and analyse risk data, design prevention and mitigation strategies, and record results of actions. ERMT is composed of three major components namely: the knowledge resources composed of electoral risk factors, analytical instruments for instance (risk maps, trend charts & registers) and preventive strategies.



Fig 1. The three main components of ERMT.

According to the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) (2013:8) an overview of the ERMT is composed of the following list of internal and external factors that have effect on and affect the electoral process. Theoretically, the factors are in concurrence with Paris (2004:188) IBL main elements and if well observed, they could mitigate, transform and manage electoral conflicts in Africa. The factors are presented in the table below.

<b>Internal electoral process factors</b>	<b>External electoral process factors</b>
<p>The electoral legal framework</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Contested electoral law</li> <li>• Unfit electoral system</li> <li>• Inadequate electoral administrative rules</li> </ul> <p>Planning and preparations for the implementation of electoral activities</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Poor performance of the electoral management bodies</li> <li>• An inadequate system for the resolution of electoral conflicts</li> <li>• Inadequate operational planning</li> <li>• Inadequate funding, financing and</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Poor socio-economic conditions</li> <li>• Political and social exclusions</li> <li>• Conflict relating to changing power dynamics</li> <li>• Gender-based discrimination and violence</li> <li>• The presence of non-state armed actors</li> <li>• The presence of organized crime groups</li> <li>• Genocide, crime against humanity and war crimes</li> <li>• Human rights violations</li> <li>• Environmental hazards</li> </ul>

<p>budgeting</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inadequate electoral security arrangements</li> </ul> <p>Training and information</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Poor training for electoral officials</li> <li>• Lack of training for political parties and media</li> <li>• Lack of training of security sector agencies</li> <li>• A poor voter information campaign</li> </ul> <p>Registration</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Problematic voter registration</li> <li>• Problematic registration of political parties and candidates</li> <li>• Problematic accreditation of domestic and international observers</li> </ul> <p>Electoral campaigning</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Unequal media access and favoritism</li> <li>• Provocative use of media by political parties</li> <li>• Provocative party rally</li> <li>• Provocative and violent actions by political parties</li> </ul> <p>Voting operations</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Insufficiency, destruction and loss of sensitive and non-sensitive materials</li> <li>• Lack of transparency of special and external voting</li> <li>• Problematic election day operations</li> <li>• Problematic ballot counting and result tallying</li> </ul> <p>Verification of election results</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Poor management of election results</li> <li>• Power management of the final round of electoral appeals</li> <li>• Rejection of election results</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Unethical media reporting</li> </ul>
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Furthermore, to prevent, mitigate, transform and manage electoral conflicts, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) through the ERMT (2013:13) proposes eight action points that should be taken into account in electoral conflicts as outlined below:

- The legal and institutional electoral framework
- Planning and preparation for the implementation of electoral activities
- Training and education
- Registration of voters, political parties and election observers
- Electoral campaigns
- Voting operation
- Election results announcement and
- The post election phase

Theoretically, as in the Institutionalisation Before Liberalisation (IBL) paradigm by Paris (2004:188) IDEA proposes a three layered approach to the prevention and mitigation of election related violence and conflicts as presented in the diagram below:




Fig 2. Adapted from IDEA (2013:11) and modified by the authors

Improved electoral management and justice includes specific measures which relates to electoral planning, implementation, coordination and dispute resolution that can be

undertaken to avoid controversies and technical flows in order to minimise the potential for outbreaks of conflict and subsequent violence. Second, improved electoral security comprises specific electoral security measures that can be undertaken through the electoral cycle process to protect electoral actors, events, facilities and materials. Finally, improved infrastructure for peace comprises the different activities that can be implemented by various state and non-state actors to mobilise and coordinate government agencies, traditional and religious leaders, reputable individuals and organisations and individuals with capacity to contribute in defusing and mitigating election-related tension, conflict and subsequent violence (IDEA 2013:11).

Also, concurrence with the IBL tenets De Zeeuw and Kumar (2006:1-3) focussing on election assistance, human rights assistance and media assistance maintains that the main focus areas for democratic electoral assistance and management are as presented in the table below.

Table 2 Main Areas for Democratic Election Assistance and management

Election Assistance	Human Rights Assistance	Media Assistance
1. Constitutional and legal reforms	1. Human rights monitoring	1. Media and elections
2. Establishment of election administration (including national election commission)	2. Support for war crime tribunals and truth commission	2. legal and regulatory reforms
3. Training of election staff	3. Legal reforms and human rights commissions	3. creation of ‘alternative’ media
4. Political party assistance	4. Strengthening law enforcement agencies	4. conflict transformation, management and resolution programming
5. International election monitoring	5. Assistance for nongovernmental human rights organizations	5. Training of media professionals
6. Civil society aid (e.g., Voter education)		6. Support to media nongovernmental and other relevant organizations.

Adapted from De Zeeuw and Kumar (2006:1-3) and modified by the authors

According to Brinkerhoff (2005:6), re-establishing security after postelection conflict also means peacekeeping operations, often coupled with humanitarian and emergency relief, since



many post-war countries have large numbers of internally displaced persons, wrecked infrastructure and disrupted economic activity. Brinkerhoff further notes that re-establishing security requires dealing with the police, military and paramilitary units and private militias through a mix of rebuilding, professionalising, reforming and dissolving. In the medium and long-term, this governance area links closely to reconstituting legitimacy. For most post-election conflict societies, civilian oversight of security forces is weak or non-existent. In addition, civil rights, judicial systems and the operation of the courts need attention. Unaccountable, corrupt and/or subversive security forces are major barriers to state legitimacy, impede the restoration of basic services and often contribute to reigniting conflict. Thus, security is a necessary precursor to stabilisation and progress towards a return to something approaching 'normal' economic and political activity. On the governance side, the status, capacity and actions of security forces are critical (Brinkerhoff 2005:6).

Southall (2009:445) in reference to the Kriegler Commission proposes alternatives for parliamentary and presidential electoral reforms as a way of managing election conflict. According to Southall, there is need for electoral reform to change electoral incentives in order to de-emphasise political mobilisation around ethnicity and stress the advantage of a shift towards mixed-member proportional election or a list system promotional representation. Such systems would move away from the winner-take-all logic of the presently established first-past-the-post electoral system, and would provide incentives to politicians to compete for votes across ethnic boundaries (Southall 2009:445). In addition, wide-ranging reforms of political institutions and other affiliated institutions are required.

Southall (2009:447) in reference to Kriegler Commission recommends for electoral system change in effort to management of electoral conflict. One option is that the first-past-the-post (FPTP) or plurality system should be reformulated in the case, where there is need to be a fair redistribution of constituencies in line with the principles of overall equality. Alternatively, Southall (2009:447) calls for the following options to be considered in managing election conflicts in Africa:

- change to a two-round election system at both the parliamentary and presidential level;
- mixed-member proportional representation (MMP) based on one ballot only (This requires changes present constituency structure);
- closed list proportional representation (PR) at the provincial or county levels, with

'gender zipping' to provide for fairer representation of women, youth and ethnic groupings; and

- closed list PR (also with 'gender, youth and ethnic zipping') at the national level.

Brinkerhoff (2005:4) argue that rebuilding effectiveness in post electoral conflict societies has to do, first and foremost, with the functions and capacity of the public sector. Good governance in this area means, for example, adequate and functioning municipal infrastructure, widely available health care and schooling, provision of roads and transportation networks and attention to social safety nets. Moreover, Brinkerhoff notes that since in most countries, effective basic services depend on more than government, the functions and capacity of the private sector and civil society are also critical. Beyond service provision, effective economic governance is included here. Good practices involve sound macroeconomic and fiscal policymaking, efficient budget management, promotion of equitably distributed wealth-creating investment opportunities, and an adequate regulatory framework.

## 5. Conclusion

The paper has looked at electoral conflicts in Africa and the resultant challenges to peace and security. The authors described the theoretical framework Institutionalisation before Liberalisation (IBL) , then discussed and interconnected the central themes; electoral conflict management, peace, Peacebuilding, post election peacebuilding and security in Africa. Nature and causes of electoral conflicts in Africa, ethnicity, postcolonial electoral conflicts, and consequences of electoral conflicts in Africa has also been discussed. The authors in reference to IBL and the Electoral Risk Management Tool (ERMT) by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) have proposed appropriate measures for the mitigating, transforming, and management of electoral conflicts through improved infrastructure for peace, improved electoral security and improved electoral management and justice system.

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